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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONTROL OF POLICE DISCRETION: THE DANISH
EXPERIENCE: By Thomas J. Aaron, Published by
Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois
In these days of strong arguments for and against the use of civilian
review boards in police cases, it was to be expected that many books
and articles would appear advocating or criticizing the concept. The
reader will be agreeably surprised to find that Mr. Aaron has avoided
the two extremes. He has written a factual, informative and objective
description of the Ombudsman system employed in Denmark. The
reader is left to make up his own mind whether this system could be
adopted in the United States to advantage as a substitute for the con-
tentious civilian review board concept.
The Danish Ombudsman is a creature of Parliament, appointed by.
it and answerable to it. Denmark has a national police force, so it was
to be expected that police operations would be a subject of legitimate
interest by Parliament.
The success of the Danish system rests upon public acceptance of
the character and impartiality of the Ombudsman who administers it.
By law, he is required to have a legal background. Though he operates
a quasi-administrative agency, the approach is judicial. Operated on the
theory that there must be an end to all controversy, the Danish law
provides that there is no appeal from his determination. Incidentally,
in dealing with complaints against the activities of regulatory agencies,
he has no authority to change the decisions of the agency himself. He
can report his findings and even suggest needed changes in the law but
he cannot substitute his decision for that of the agency.
In police cases, the complaints in Denmark bear a remarkable
similarity to those in this country. They involve favoritism, the issuance
of improper regulations, the neglect of the police to follow prescribed
procedures, i.e., failure to inform the accused of his right to remain
silent, the failure of the police to make a complete investigation of
charges against their own members, discourtesy, "talking out of turn,"
failure to pay their bills, excessive use of force, etc. The reports of the
Ombudsman on individual complaints are quite complete-thorough
enough to convince the complainant that his complaint was taken ser-
iously and was carefully and fairly investigated.
Of particular interest is the number of complaints processed by the
Danish Ombudsman. In the period between 1955 and 1959, he and his
staff processed 4,500 complaints. Of this number, one-third turned out
to be within the proper scope of the Ombudsman.
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The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Bar-
bara, California conducted an exploration of this subject in 1966. They
point out that the desirability of an office of "public protector," "citizens
defender," or Ombudsman is being increasingly explored in this coun-
try. It is said that our citizens require protection against "inefficiency,
maladministration, arrogance, and abuse on the part of the government."
Governmental bureaucracy at all levels, federal, state and local, has
allegedly reached the point that the need for an office of this kind is
imperative. Like Mr. Aaron, Stanley V. Anderson, a political scientist
at the University of California, has been studying the history and cur-
rent operations of the -Ombudsman in other countries and the feasibility
of the office for the United States. Professor Walter Gellhorn of
Columbia University wrote a scholarly article on this subject for the
summer, 1966 edition of the Columbia University Forum. The views
expressed in these two works are typical of the discussion now in
progress.
In November, the voters of New York City by a significant margin
rejected the concept of the civilian review board of police activities set
up by Mayor Lindsay. The resulting discussion has veered away from
the need for civilian review boards and has switched to the need for an
Ombudsman. The question is: Why? Much of the criticism against
New York's civilian review board was due to a belief on the part of
the public that the board was "stacked" with people so deeply committed
to the civil rights cause as to be lacking in objectivity in appraising ra-
cial complaints involving policemen. (Many of the complaints, of
course, were completely unrelated to racial problems). Apparently, a
large segment of the public believed these men were lacking in judicial
impartiality.
True impartiality, of course, is the stock in trade of the Danish
Ombudsman. He is selected because his reputation for complete ob-
jectivity is unquestioned.
In America, we go to great lengths to provide impartial arbiters in
our judicial function. The litigant can challenge a juryman for bias.
He can ask the judge to disqualify himself for interest in the matter
and, if necessary, can seek a change of venue to try the case in some
community in which there is no prior knowledge of the facts. Looking
back at the New York experiment, it now seems understandable that
the public would not long accept a system in which the judges, though
honest and sincere in their convictions, were nevertheless identified in
a sizeable sector of the public mind with one side of the controversy.
On the other hand, the civil rights people complained that the former
police review board was "stacked" the other way-with people with a
bias in favor of the police and against the complainant; it is now
suggested that both groups, as a compromise, would be willing to accept
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a review by some impartial arbiter like an Ombudsman. It is said that
even some members of the police force, mindful of their own internal
difficulties, also lean to this concept.
What is the stumbling block? Once again public distrust enters
the picture. Many people looked upon the creation of the civilian review
board in New York by Mayor Lindsay as a political device designed to
attract votes from racial and liberal groups. Professor Walton Hamilton
of the Yale Law School in his 1957 book, "The Politics of Industry,"
pointed out that there is a quaint custom in this country of stacking
regulatory agencies with commissioners either from or with a bias
toward the industry they are supposed to regulate. The presence on the
National Labor Relations Board of men with alleged labor or employer
bias, all appointed by the President, is cited as an illustration of the
difficulties of keeping these agencies impartial.
What worries many of the proponents of the Ombudsman concept
is that in a country the size of America the Ombudsmen would have
to operate with large staffs, bureaucracies in themselves. It would be
a case of one bureaucracy reviewing the actions of another. And if
the bureaucracy of the Ombudsman was staffed by the usual American
political process, it is conceivable that in a few years this new form of
review agency-like New York's departed civilian review board-
would soon lose its reputation for impartiality and be no different or
better than the agencies it was appointed to review. All that would have
been accomplished, in this view, is that one more level of overhead
had been added to the government to be paid for by the taxpayers.
On these overshadowing issues, Mr. Aaron's work sheds no light
and of course, was not intended to. He does prove that in a small
country like Denmark where a citizenry honors and expects impartiality
from those in government appointed to review the actions of others,
good can result. We are left to wonder whether if such a system were
set up in the United States, it might conceivably function better if it
was operated and staffed along the lines of our courts, even though, as
in Denmark, it was an adjunct of our legislative bodies. Mr. Aaron is
to be complimented for providing a dispassionate, factual review and
thereby enable us to have a better understanding of this development.
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